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ABSTRACT  
This thesis engages with two emerging bodies of scholarship: the history of human rights and 
the history of U.S. neoconservatism. It begins with an exploration of the genesis of the 
contemporary international human rights movement, arguing that human rights as we know and 
understand them today were a product of the latter half of the twentieth century. Their path, 
however, was not a clear one. The emergence of neoconservative ideology in U.S. domestic 
politics would greatly impact upon the trajectory of the human rights movement under the 
presidencies of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. The latter period witnessed a c onflict 
between America‟s Watch and the Reagan administration over human rights as an „idea‟ and 
as praxis,  with U.S.  policy towards Latin America as the primary battle field   
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Introduction 
 
Of Struggles and Conflicts:  
History, Human Rights and U.S. (Neo-)Conservatism 
 
It does no service to the cause of human rights to disguise the struggles and conflicts of interest that 
accompanied their emergence into the international arena. On the contrary, a better understanding of that story, 
their relationship to prior rights regimes, and their dependence on the international balance of power may help 
us to recognize their true weight and worth.
1
 – Mark Mazower 
 
 The history of the international human rights movement and the history of U.S. 
conservatism are both relatively new fields of historical study. This thesis delves into both. 
Firstly, it is a study of the trajectory of the international human rights movement and the 
„struggles‟ that brought human rights into being as we know and understand them today. 
Secondly, it examines the „conflicts of interest‟ that brought them from the periphery of 
politics, to the very heart of global rhetoric. At the heart of the following narrative is the 
battle between America‟s Watch and the Reagan administration over the „idea‟ of human 
rights, a battle that exposed the tension between human rights as law and human rights as 
morality. It is also about their application in praxis. The Reaganite neoconservative 
conception of human rights, and its application in Latin American foreign policy, is the focal 
point of my analysis. Guiding this thesis is an interest in the struggle for hegemony over 
human rights discourse: what context they are invoked in, and why.  
                                                          
1
 Mark Mazower, „The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950,‟ The Historical Journal, vol. 47, no. 2 
(2004), p. 398. 
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 Human rights are extraordinary in that they are perhaps the „ultimate empty 
signifier.‟2 As while the idea itself carries great import and levity, what they actually mean 
differs from one person to the next. This is equally true for their study.
3
 Currently there are 
two main schools of thought on the history of human rights, one stressing continuities and the 
other discontinuities.  On the one hand, scholars that highlight continuities often expound a 
teleological view of rights that explain human rights in evolutionary terms. This view 
constructs a genealogy of traditional political and legal ideas and of present day human rights 
discourse. Such a view is typified by Paul Gordon Lauren‟s The Evolution of International 
Human Rights: Visions Seen.
4
 On the other hand, scholars argue that „Human Rights‟ as it is 
understood today was a phenomenon of the second half of the twentieth century, and that 
whilst the concept of „rights‟ has a long history, the notion of „human rights‟ was used at the 
most sporadically until the 1940s and did not gain serious traction as a movement until the 
1970s. Such a view stresses discontinuities and critiques the narrative version of much human 
rights scholarship, positioning human rights as a political ideal that is historically contingent. 
Samuel Moyn‟s The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History is a leading example of the 
emphasis on discontinuity and contingency.
5
 This thesis will draw heavily from this second 
school of thought.  
Whilst there has been increasing interest by historians in human rights, the growth of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the process has been left largely unexamined. 
There are a number of notable exceptions. These include the works by Tom Buchanan and 
Barbara Keys who have published histories of Amnesty International, and by Sarah Snyder, 
                                                          
2
 Kenneth Cmiel, „The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States,‟ The Journal of American 
History, vol. 68, no. 3 (Dec., 1999), p. 1248. 
3
 For an informative historiographical essay on the history of human rights, see: Kenneth Cmiel, „The Recent 
History of Human Rights,‟ The American Historical Review, vol. 109, no. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 117-135. 
4
 Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of Human Rights: Visions Seen, 3
rd
 Ed. (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2011).  
5
 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass.; London, England: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2010). 
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who has recently written a study on the development of human rights activism and the 
Helsinki Accords.
6
 Scholarship on Human Rights Watch is virtually non-existent, the 
exceptions being William Korey‟s cursory analysis in NGOs and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights: A Curious Grapevine and a descriptive article by Bruce Montgomery on 
the Human Rights Watch archives.
7
 That being said, there is a considerable literature in the 
fields of political science and international relations dealing with the role of NGOs and other 
trans- and international networks of human rights activism and politics. The work of 
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink is particularly illuminating in that it provides a 
conceptual framework in which to locate the development of Human Rights Watch as a part 
of a transnational advocacy network.
8
  
This thesis will also engage with a sub-field of history in its infancy – the history of 
US conservatism, with particular attention given to the history of neoconservatism. Until 
recently, the history of American conservatism has been largely ignored. The Conservative 
Intellectual Tradition Since 1945, published almost thirty-five years ago by George H. Nash, 
remained unchallenged in its reign as an accepted understanding of the development of 
conservatism.
9
 Nash is widely described as „the Conservatives‟ historian,‟ and an 
                                                          
6
 Barbara Keys, „Anti-Torture Politics: Amnesty International, the Greek Junta, and the Origins of the Human 
Rights “Boom”,‟ in The Human Rights Revolution: An International History, Petra Goedde, William Hitchcock, 
and Akira Iriye, eds. (Oxford: New York; Oxford University Press, 2012); Tom Buchanan, „Amnesty 
International in Crisis, 1966-7,‟ Twentieth Century British History, vol. 15, no. 3 (2004), pp. 267-289; Tom 
Buchanan, „“The Truth Will Set You Free”: The Making of Amnesty International,‟ Journal of Contemporary 
History, vol. 37, no. 4 (2002), pp. 575-597; and, Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the 
Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
7
 William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Curious Grapevine, 1
st
 Palgrave Ed. 
(New York: Palgrave, 2001); Bruce Montgomery, „The Human Rights Watch Archives,‟ Peace Review, vol. 14, 
no. 4 (2002), pp. 455-463. Also, Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, touch on Human Rights Watch in their piece, 
„From the Cold War to Kosovo: The Rise and Renewal of the Field of International Human Rights,‟ Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science, vol. 2, no. 1 (Dec., 2006), pp. 240-244. Also, William Korey devotes a 
chapter to the Ford Foundation‟s involvement in Human Rights Watch in Taking on the World's Repressive 
Regimes: The Ford Foundation’s International Human Rights Policies and Practices (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), pp. 89-118. 
8
 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy networks in international politics 
(Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press, 1998).  
9
 George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (New York, 1976). For more 
on the historiography of US conservatism, see the essay by Donald T. Critchlow, „Rethinking American 
Conservatism: Toward a New Narrative,‟ The Journal of American History, vol. 98, no. 3 (Dec., 2011), pp. 752-
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unabashedly conservative political activist: his intellectual career steeped in, and supported 
by, the „conservative counterculture‟ in which his work is rooted. 10  Thus, it is unsurprising 
that his histories are often „hero narratives.‟ His account of Reagan‟s contribution to the 
movement is illustrative of this. In the essay „Ronald Reagan‟s Legacy and American 
Conservatism,‟ Nash portrays Reagan as an „emblematic and ecumenical‟ conservative who 
brought together all five conservative „impulses‟ simultaneously.11 The emphasis on „fusion‟ 
is characteristic of this style of conservative history – one that presents a homogenous and 
triumphalist narrative of American conservatism. And while there is no doubt that Reagan 
was seminal figure in the movement, there is far more nuance to the movement than Nash 
would have one believe. As Jason Stahl notes in a review of Nash‟s 2009 volume of essays 
titled Reappraising the Right: The Past, Present & Future of American Conservatism, that: 
„Every movement needs a movement historian and Nash performs this role dutifully.‟12 Thus, 
there is much room for development within the field.  
There are a few histories of the movement that provide the nuance that has been 
noticeably absent from much conservative historiography. The most impressive is Justin 
Vaisse‟s Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement.13 In focusing on a particular strain 
of conservatism, Vaisse reveals the complexity of a political movement that is far from 
homogenous. He identifies three „ages‟ of the neoconservative movement: the „First Age‟ of 
„Liberal Intellectuals in Dissent,‟ the „Second Age‟ of „Cold War Democrats in Dissent,‟ and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
755. Critchlow argues that any understanding of the American conservative movement „must acknowledge that 
conservatism and liberalism have changed over time... and any understanding of conservatism needs to be 
framed within a context of liberal politics,‟ p. 754. Also, Kim Phillips-Fein provides a detailed historiographical 
analysis in the essay „Conservatism: A State of the Field,‟ The Journal of American History, vol. 98, no. 3 
(Dec., 2011), pp. 723-743. She notes that one of the major „dilemmas‟ of writing about US conservatism is that 
of definition (p. 727), and also questions the dominance of a triumphalist narrative that focuses on the „successes 
of the Right‟ (p. 740), particularly in histories of the Reagan era.  
10
 Jason Stahl, „Review of Nash, George H., Reappraising the Right: The Past & Future of American 
Conservatism,‟ H-1960s, H-Net Reviews (March, 2011), http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=31209, 
last accessed 17 May 2012. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid.  
13
 Justin Vaisse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, 
Mass.; Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).  
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the „Third Age‟ of „National Greatness Conservatives.‟14 It is Vaisse‟s interpretation that 
informs much of the second chapter of this thesis as he presents a convincing and nuanced 
argument about the fraught politics underlying Reagan‟s presidential victory, and the political 
theorists who would inform his policies. There is much debate within the field as to what 
degree Reagan was a true „neoconservative.‟15 This debate is one that will not be engaged in 
this thesis. Instead, this will be an examination of the relationship between two processes: the 
emergence of neoconservatism and its role in the formulation and implementation of United 
States foreign policy, and the development of international human rights discourse and 
activism. In doing so I hope to shed new light on what was a transformative time for both the 
international human rights movement and the American political landscape.  
Chapter One of this thesis provides the context for the contemporary international 
human rights movement. In it, it will be argued that human rights as they are understood 
today were a product of the latter half of the twentieth century. The 1940s saw the movement 
from collective minority rights to individual rights that would facilitate the drafting of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, issued in 1948. This however, would be a „strange 
triumph‟ for human rights as although they received much attention, the Universal 
Declaration lacked any positive legal value and consequently remained largely 
unenforceable.
16
 The onset of the Cold War and wars of decolonisation ensured that human 
rights were sidelined as a global priority. It would not be until the 1970s that human rights 
                                                          
14
 Vaisse, Neoconservatism, p. 1.  
15
 See, for example, Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, „Neoconservatism is Not Reaganism,‟ The American 
Spectator, vol. 37, no. 3 (Apr. 2004), pp. 20-24; and, Tamar Jacoby, „The Reagan Turnaround on Human 
Rights,‟ Foreign Affairs, vol. 64, no. 5 (Jul., 1986), pp. 1066-1086. Also, Vaisse talks of the fine line walked by 
Reagan and the „neoconservatives,‟ arguing that while Reagan had „neoconservative sensibility,‟ he also had 
other „imperatives.‟ This would become increasingly evident during his second presidential term, when he 
began to stray from the hardline policies and rhetoric that characterised his first term toward a more conciliatory 
approach to foreign policy. See: Vaisse, Neoconservatism, pp. 195-200.  
16
 Mazower, „The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950,‟ The Historical Journal, vol. 47, no. 2 (2004), 
p. 398. One notable exception being the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. For more on the 
European human rights regime see: Mikael Rask Madsen, „From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European 
Court: The European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics,‟ 
Law and Social Inquiry, vol. 32, no. 1 (Winter, 2007), pp. 137-159.  
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would be permanently revived and thrust into the heart of global rhetoric. The „enforcement 
revolution‟ of this period, facilitated by revolutions in communications and travel, saw 
activist networks proliferate, and the international human rights movement bloom.    
Chapter Two of this thesis deals with the politics of anti-politics as played out under 
Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. It explores how US foreign policy pundits appropriated 
human rights discourse resulting in its decoupling from its traditional grounding international 
law. This significantly impacted the trajectory of the international human rights movement.  
Fundamental to understanding the new direction human rights took is the machinations of US 
politics at this time. It was Jimmy Carter, with his promise to morally transcend politics, who 
would bring human rights to the fore and gave the „idea‟ unprecedented exposure. Carter‟s 
inability to translate rhetoric to policy, however, led to his loss of the presidency in 1980. 
Reagan achieved the policy crystallisation that Carter lacked. „Democracy promotion,‟ would 
be a core tenet of the Reagan administration‟s foreign policy throughout his two terms to 
largely devastating effect, as human rights were transposed into the realm of morality.  
Chapter Three of this thesis deals with the consequences of Reagan‟s victory for 
human rights as an „idea‟ and as a movement. Through an investigation of the Reagan 
administration‟s approach to human rights in its foreign policy it will be argued that they 
acted as „surrogate villains.‟17 The policy of „democracy promotion‟ ideologically justified 
the support of right-wing autocratic regimes for the Reagan administration. A case in point 
will be their application of foreign policy in El Salvador. As the El Salvadoran Civil War fell 
victim to the East-West matrix that dominated US foreign policy in the Reagan era. However, 
as the Reagan administration insisted on framing their policies in human rights discourse they 
                                                          
17
 Aryeh Neier, Taking Liberties: Four decades in the struggle for rights (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), p. 
220.  
11 
 
became increasingly rhetorically entrapped.
 18
 America‟s Watch would play a principle role 
in holding the Reagan administration to account. The battle over words and deeds that ensued 
significantly impacted upon the trajectory of human rights discourse and activism.  
In sum, this thesis is an investigation of what was a profoundly transformative time 
for two seemingly autonomous processes: the international human rights movement and the 
emergence of American neoconservatism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Nicolas Guilhot, „Limiting Sovereignty or Producing Governmentality? Two Human Rights Regimes in U.S. 
Political Discourse,‟ Constellations, vol. 15, no. 4 (2008), p. 502. 
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Chapter One 
 
A Human Rights ‘Revolution’?  
A Short History of the Contemporary Human Rights Movement 
 
...things can be, and quite frequently are, contingent without being random, accidental or arbitrary.
19
  
– Susan Marks.  
The General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping 
this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights 
and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of 
territories under their jurisdiction. – Preamble, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
In this chapter, it will be argued that human rights as we conceive of them today were 
a product of the latter half of the twentieth century, as it was only in the final years of the 
Second World War that human rights as individual rights was proposed. The idea of an 
individual rights regime culminated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This 
was more a „strange triumph‟ than a „human rights revolution,‟ as the Universal Declaration 
lacked positive legal value, and was therefore largely unenforceable.
20
 Moreover, the 
achievements of the 1940s were rapidly eclipsed by the onset of the Cold War and wars of 
decolonisation. It would take the „enforcement revolution‟ of the 1970s to truly embed human 
rights into the heart of global rhetoric.  
                                                          
19
 Susan Marks, „Human Rights and Root Causes,‟ The Modern Law Review, vol. 74, no. 1 (2011), p. 74. 
20
 Mazower, „The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950,‟ p. 379. 
13 
 
Talk of rights has a long and often fractured history. The idea of individual human 
rights as we understand them today, however, was a product of the latter half of the twentieth 
century. The 1940s saw collective minority rights supplanted by the idea of individual human 
rights. Although many refer to this period as a „Human Rights Revolution,‟ the revolution 
would not be fully executed for decades to come. Instead, human rights would achieve, to 
borrow from Mark Mazower, a „strange triumph,‟ in the face of a new world order that did 
not want to entirely abandon the old ways.
21
 State sovereignty and empire would remain key 
considerations. And, as the newly formed United Nations would find, this meant that the 
enforcement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights would be problematic. The rapid 
onset of the Cold War, coupled with the wars of decolonisation, overshadowed the 
achievements of the 1940s. As while human rights talk did not wholly disappear, it was 
primarily localised as alternate agendas were prioritised. It would not be until the 1970s that 
the „human rights revolution‟ would culminate. The communication and enforcement 
revolutions, driven by the rapidly developing activist network, would provide the movement 
with the impetus it lacked in the 1940s. The changing nature of activism would have a lasting 
effect on the international human rights movement. As the field was professionalised, 
credibility, neutrality and impartiality would become hallmarks of the movement that had 
gained a permanent place on the international agenda.  
The 1940s heralded what many have called a „Human Rights Revolution.‟22 Although 
rights talk had been around in various incarnations for centuries, human rights as we know 
and understand them today were borne of this period. Most notably, the 1940s saw the move 
from collective and minority rights to individual rights. The framing of human rights as 
                                                          
21
 Ibid. 
22
 G. Daniel Cohen, „The “Human Rights Revolution” at Work: Displaced Persons in Postwar Europe,‟ in 
Stephan-Ludwig Hoffmann ed., Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), p. 48; See also, The Human Rights Revolution: An International History, Petra Goedde, William I. 
Hitchcock, and, Akira Iriye, eds. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
14 
 
individual rights was a novel development for internationalists. The minority rights regime 
had been particularly problematic – as the ashes of the League of Nations would attest – and 
was something that none of the victors in 1945 desired to revive post-war.
23
 Individual 
human rights were a more plausible option for the Great Powers as a universal minority rights 
policy would compromise almost all involved.
24
 Particularly the Big Three, as they retained 
domestic policies and practices – the racial policies of the United States, the colonial 
practices of the British, and the Soviet expulsion of ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern 
Europe – that would contravene any such regime. Individual rights were attractive as they 
simultaneously provided a new focus for post-war rights talk, and quietly allowed for 
collective rights to be swept under the carpet. The assumption was that if individual rights 
were secured, by extension, so too would the minority rights regime that dominated the first 
half of the twentieth century. As Mark Mazower has noted, „the minorities treaties 
themselves were not so much terminated as allowed to die an unlamented death.‟25 Individual 
human rights talk found its way onto the international stage as the Allies attempted to paint a 
new, positive picture of the world post-war and sweep minority rights under the carpet.
26
  
As World War II came to an end attention turned to the new international 
organisation: the United Nations.
27
 By 1945, the time of unrivalled European dominance of 
world politics had come to an end and there were many interests at play. The predominance 
of the US and the USSR was now unquestionable and their rivalry intensifying. Furthermore, 
                                                          
23
 For more on minority and collective rights, see: Mazower, „The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-
1950,‟ pp. 397-398; Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage Books, 
2000), especially chapter 2; and, A. W. Brain Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the 
Genesis of the European Convention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), particularly chapter three for 
pre-War minority rights and the League of Nations and chapter seven for the decision by the UN to abandon 
minority rights.  
24
 Mazower, „The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950,‟ p. 387. 
25
 Ibid., p. 390. 
26
 Jan Eckel, „Human Rights and Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open Questions,‟ Humanity, vol. 1, no. 
1 (Fall, 2010) p. 111. 
27
 For more on the creation of the United Nations Organisation see: Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The 
End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Oxford; New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2009).  
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the rising tide of anticolonial forces and the increasing number of newly independent states in 
the United Nations meant that there were more agendas to be reckoned with. The twentieth 
century had seen not only an expansion of the nation-state, but also the preservation of the 
sanctity of state sovereignty and imperial designs. Interestingly, in the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks 
draft of the UN Charter there was no provision regarding human rights included. Rather, it 
was the Latin American and western NGOs who were mainly responsible for their inclusion 
at the 1945 San Francisco conference. During the conference, when the issue of human rights 
as a central tenet of the objectives of the United Nations was brought up there was little 
objection to the notion itself. Instead, the concern was with the binding nature of the 
statement of the ideal, rather than the ideal itself. In the negotiations for the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, it was state sovereignty that would prove a sticking point as 
the new world order clung on to old ways.
28
  
Enforceability had been a mortal issue for the League of Nations; it was yet to be seen 
if it would prove any different for the newly established United Nations. It was no secret that 
it was highly unlikely any of the power-brokers in 1945 would to agree to a statement of 
human rights that was binding. As British Foreign Officer Charles Webster pointedly noted in 
1945, „Our policy... is to avoid a “guarantee of human rights” though we might not object to 
a declaration.‟29 Thus, it is fair to say that concessions were made when the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was finally issued in 1948. Most notable was the resolution that 
States should „promote‟ and „strive‟ to „achieve‟ the standards set by the thirty articles – 
although they were not bound to abide by them by any measure.
30
 The reality was that it was 
                                                          
28
 Moyn notes in his book The Last Utopia, that „the Allies meant for the basic principles of postwar 
international organization to be perfectly compatible with empire,‟ p. 44. 
29
 Charles Webster quoted in Mazower, „The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, p. 392. The British would 
subsequently push for a binding UN human rights convention, although it would lack effective measures of 
implementation. See: A. W. Brain Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire, especially chapter‟s seven 
and eight. 
30
 United Nations General Assembly, „Preamble,‟ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 10 December 1948, 
217 A (III), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html, last accessed 21 May 2012.   
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little more than its title suggested – a declaration – albeit, one bathed in idealism and 
sentiment.  Ultimately, the Universal Declaration lacked positive legal value.
31
 Thus, whilst 
the 1940s certainly marked an impressive moment for human rights, the „revolution‟ was 
never fully executed. With the exception of the 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights, the international community had failed to give the movement teeth in the form of 
enforceability through their reluctance to create a binding statement of human rights that was 
supported by a system of liability or accountability for non-conforming states. The suggestive 
nature of the Universal Declaration meant that in reality, states could act as they please with 
little or no consequence. It would take another few decades for the „revolution‟ to be 
complete. Meanwhile, the new individual rights regime of the United Nations would benefit 
from their abstractness and ambiguity as it enabled them to be embraced on an international 
level – irrespective of their lack of enforceability. As G. Daniel Cohen has highlighted, the 
success of human rights in the 1940s owed to the fact that they did not, in any fundamental 
way, challenge the nation-state or world-order.
32
 Therefore, the 1940s marked not so much a 
revolution, but rather a „strange triumph‟ for human rights as a global idiom if not a 
practice.
33
 
Furthermore, the Cold War and wars of decolonisation would quickly overshadow the 
achievements of the 1940s. By the early 1950s, Cold War rivalries were ensuring that the 
cooperation of the 1940s would not be replicated. The UN also found itself being utilised as 
an arena for the airing of grievances and competing interests. Cold War warriors and seekers 
of independence alike were increasingly employing human rights discourse as a weapon in 
                                                          
31
 Michael Cotey Morgan, „The Seventies and the Rebirth of Human Rights,‟ in The Shock of the Global: the 
1970s in Perspective, ed. Niall Ferguson et. al. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2010) p. 238. 
32
 Cohen, „The “Human Rights Revolution” at Work,‟ p. 60. 
33
 Mazower, „The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, p. 379. 
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their respective campaigns within the channels of the UN.
34
 Whilst both the Cold War and 
wars of decolonisation were being fought on many fronts, claims of human rights abuse 
carried weight – for those looking to upstage a competing hegemon or seeking colonial 
emancipation, rights talk was particularly effective. Despite this, escalation of the Cold War 
meant that the focus on human rights questions was short lived. The price of peace was 
accepting communist rule, as challenging the Soviets could upset the delicate balance of 
power between Washington and the USSR.
35
 As competition spread across the globe, 
Washington was increasingly willing to support autocratic right-wing regimes – particularly 
in Latin America and Africa – with questionable human rights records, all in the name of the 
fight against communist expansion. This would prove a hot issue for the human rights 
movement in the 1980s. The momentum of the human rights movement of the 1940s had, for 
the meantime, fallen victim to Cold War considerations. 
As Jan Eckel has argued, the question of the presence of human rights discourse in 
anticolonial movements is a „question of proportions.‟36 On a local level, human rights talk 
was not central to the movement. For many seeking emancipation, the language of rights 
often did not translate locally.
37
 On an international level, however, human rights assumed a 
more prominent role. For many pan-continental alliances, such as the Africans and Asians, 
human rights discourse served as an effective vehicle through which to legitimise their claims 
for independence and critique the practice of colonial rule on the international stage.
38
 As 
Fabian Klose notes, „anti-colonial movements were effectively utilizing human rights 
                                                          
34
 For more on the Cold War deadlock in the UN see Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN: 
The Political History of Universal Justice (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2008), particularly 
pages 197-200. 
35
 Morgan, „The Seventies and the Rebirth of Human Rights,‟ p. 240. 
36
 Eckel, „Human Rights and Decolonization,‟ p. 115. 
37
 For example, see Marks, „Human Rights and Root Causes,‟ pp. 73-4. 
38
 Eckel, „Human Rights and Decolonization,‟ p. 113. For more on human rights and decolonisation, Roland 
Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia, Penn.: University of 
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documents as a moral basis to force the colonial powers increasingly into the dock of world 
opinion.‟39 For this reason, Third World enthusiasm for human rights reached its highpoint in 
the 1950s.
40
 Human rights, however, were more a tool in, than a central ideological concern 
of, the anticolonial movement. This would become increasingly evident as those who had 
effectively utilised human rights discourse in the UN to name and shame oppressors, would 
become equally proficient in blocking debate on abuses and crimes committed by post-
colonial states.
41
  
The 1970s marked a watershed moment for the international human rights movement, a 
moment that would culminate in the manifestation of human rights as we know and 
understand them today. Facilitated by a growing dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the 
UN and the impotence of the international community to act decisively on human rights 
issues, human rights was revived in the 1970s in an unprecedented way. The proliferation of 
communication technology, globalism, and the international media had created a more porous 
understanding of international boundaries. Domestic issues in faraway places were now 
beamed directly into the living rooms of a public that was increasingly less apathetic to 
human rights issues.
42
 The civil rights movements of the 1960s had had an impact, as had the 
Vietnam War, decolonisation, and growing awareness of the Holocaust. Many now 
associated silence with complicity, and so in the West there was a growing sense of moral 
responsibility for the actions, or inaction, of one‟s government.43 The grassroots activism of 
the 1960s (such as the letter writing campaigns of Amnesty International) had demonstrated 
for many that they, as an individual, could make a difference. The Western public were 
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increasingly demanding the enforcement of human rights beyond national borders.
 44
 Human 
rights had entered popular discourse and truly become a global concept: they were no longer 
the exclusive domain of international diplomacy. 
Enforceability had always been an issue for rights talk of any kind – and the post-war 
human rights movement had been no exception. The 1970s, however, saw an explosion of 
non-state actors. In particular, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who took on the task 
of enforcement where governments would not. This „enforcement revolution,‟ as G. Daniel 
Cohen has coined it, was the impetus the movement had direly required.
45
 Operating on the 
periphery of politics, NGOs rejected traditional politics instead opting for innovative ways to 
pressure key persons or governments to adhere to the codes of conduct that many had ratified 
but ignored nonetheless. The communication revolution meant that activists could now 
communicate not only more quickly, but also cheaply. Additionally, the commercialisation of 
air travel meant that activists could go on fact-finding missions with far more frequency at a 
fraction of the cost.
46
 This, coupled with the explosion of the global media, meant that human 
rights issues and abuses could be catalogued, documented and broadcast with far more 
accuracy and efficiency, moving information to places where significant pressure could be 
placed to effect change. As Kenneth Cmiel argues, for the new breed of NGOs „theirs was a 
politics of the global flow of key bits of fact‟ – human rights politics became a politics of 
information and images that was neither localised nor contextualised.
 47
 The liquidity of the 
human rights ideal meant that it operated and was implemented as a form of „anti-politics.‟48 
Such an interpretation embodied the liberal notion of human rights as something natural and 
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innate: a limit to, rather than an element of, the political sphere.
49
 Inherent within this 
conception was the assumption that human rights themselves were not political. The 
international human rights movement in the 1970s was based on a form of „moral 
interventionism‟ whereby governments were pressured to match their words with their deeds 
by groups operating on the periphery of politics.
50
 This conception would prove problematic 
for the movement. Although it did result in the globalisation and popularisation of language 
of human rights, and a plethora of activists and NGOs willing to enforce compliance.  
Central to the moral interventionism of the 1970s was a transformation in the nature 
of activism and its funding. A fundamental element of being „non-government‟ was a 
detachment from centralised forms of power, particularly the state. The 1960s, however, had 
seen a number of the major NGOS, such as Amnesty International and the International 
Commission of Jurists, fall victim to scandals that threatened the credibility not only of the 
organisations, but of the movement in general. In 1966, Amnesty International was accused 
of being infiltrated by British intelligence and receiving British Government funds. At the 
centre of the crisis was Amnesty International‟s founder and president, Peter Benenson, who 
had facilitated the receipt of government funding in a „covert and unattributable‟ manner for 
some of its humanitarian projects.
51
 The scandal broke and cost Benenson his job, but did not 
cause any lasting damage to Amnesty International‟s international reputation. This was 
largely due to professionalisation of the organisation in the mid-1960s. Key to this was the 
pioneering by Amnesty International investigators of a new way of reporting human rights 
abuses. Through fastidious research and fact-finding missions, followed up with regular and 
accurate reporting, Amnesty International had positioned itself as the international leader in 
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the field. Thanks to its reputation for accurate, neutral and autonomous reporting, the 
resignation of Benenson seemed to remedy a potentially irredeemable situation.  
The professionalisation of the human rights movement in the late-1960s and early-
1970s revolutionised the nature of human rights activism. It was through the reporting system 
pioneered by Amnesty International that governments were increasingly being held 
accountable for their actions. Amnesty International‟s country reports were used in many 
cases of human rights abuses. A notable early case was the use of Amnesty International‟s 
1967-8 reports on the use of torture in Greece in the Council of Europe that led to its 
expulsion from the Council in 1969.
52
 Such reporting would become a core tenet of human 
rights activism and remains so today. However, unlike Amnesty International, the 
International Commission of Jurists found that their Cold War affiliations were not so easy to 
side step. One of the first post-war NGOs, the International Commission of Jurists was 
established, initially at least, to solely serve U.S. Cold War interests. It was funded entirely 
by the CIA, and was staffed by CIA recruits.
53
 As such, the International Commission of 
Jurists was limited by its reputation as a Cold War political vehicle. It would take a complete 
renovation of its operations and objectives to recover from the 1967 revelations of its 
symbiotic relationship with the CIA.
54
 Credibility had become crucial for the success of 
activists and NGOs. And as Susan Marks has noted, credibility could only be gained and 
maintained through a commitment to a „neutral, impartial and non-political‟ activist model.55  
The professionalisation of the human rights movement had other implications. Whilst 
the activism of the 1960s was characterised by grassroots activism and mass movements, the 
1970s saw a contraction in the way activists agitated for change. It was becoming 
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increasingly apparent that the mass mobilisations that characterised the activism of the 1960s 
were no longer necessary to effect change. As Kenneth Cmiel explains, equally, if not more 
effective, was the „post-populist‟ strategy of „third-party influence.‟56 Through lobbying of 
elites by professional activists, pressure was being placed on those in power to effect change 
from the top. Similarly, NGOs were finding new ways of raising funds other than fundraising 
appeals to members. Large philanthropic funds were becoming increasingly responsive to 
human rights causes – and, convincing a committee of a large fund was more lucrative than a 
fundraising drive among a supporter database.
57
 Consequently NGOs were finding it easier to 
exist and grow without a massive support base. As such, a new breed of small, 
professionalised NGOs with access to the elite and halls of power was born.  
Meanwhile, the Cold War was still being waged – and human rights was to be pushed 
to the fore once more. In 1975, after three years of negotiations at the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Helsinki Final Act was signed.
58
 Emerging from the 
context of detente, there were thirty-five signatories to the Act that contained „confidence-
building‟ agreements on political borders, trade, movement of people, the military, and 
human rights norms.
59
 Again, principles concerning human rights – Principles VII: „Respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion or belief‟; and, VIII: „Equal rights and self-determination of peoples‟ – were 
conceded only with the inclusion of a principle of „non-intervention in internal affairs.‟60 
Following the precedent set by their experience in the UN, the signatories – particularly the 
USSR – assumed that the human rights clauses, as Tony Judt wryly observed, were simply 
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„diplomatic window dressing, a sop to domestic opinion‟; and would be, as the Universal 
Declaration had been, largely unenforceable.
61
 How wrong they would prove to be. The 
signing of the Helsinki Final Act would have consequences unforseen by all. Upon signing 
the agreement, US President Gerald Ford stated that: „History will judge this Conference, not 
by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow – not by the promises we make, but 
by the promises we keep.‟62 The advent of the enforcement revolution within the international 
human rights movement would provide the structures, mechanisms, and personnel that would 
ensure that promises were kept.  
This was no more evident than in the Soviet Union. The Moscow Helsinki Watch Group 
was established on 12 May 1976 with the distinct purpose of ensuring Soviet compliance 
with the principles of the Helsinki Accords. As whilst the non-interference clause prevented 
other states from monitoring domestic happenings, there was no such clause preventing 
internal monitor groups. The Moscow Helsinki Watch consisted of a group of veteran Soviet 
dissidents – Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Andrei Sakharov, Elena Bonner, Aleksandr Ginsburg, 
Vitaly Rubin, and Anatoly Shcharansky – headed by Yuri Orlov, who declared it necessary to 
publicly announce human rights conditions in the USSR according to the obligations set out 
in the so-called „Third Basket‟ provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Their activism would 
inspire a revival of Soviet dissident and human rights movement that had suffered as a result 
of the repression of the early 1970s.
63
 Within the year, two more Helsinki Watch Groups had 
founded within the USSR – Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Group and the Lithuanian Public 
Group to Promote the Observance of the Helsinki Accords – and by the end of 1977 Helsinki 
Watch Group‟s had established in Georgia and Armenia. Communist leaders had unwittingly 
created a breach in their defences.  
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Through emphasising Helsinki as a source of international legitimacy for their regime, the 
Soviet leaders had opened themselves to public pressure and scrutiny, both at home and 
abroad.
64
 The Helsinki network that developed within the USSR would have a profound 
influence on the dissidence of the following decade. Furthermore, the networks developed by 
the Helsinki groups would not remain a domestic affair. Although the Soviet authorities 
responded to the increased dissent with what Daniel Thomas has called „unprecedented 
tolerance,‟ that is, they were allowed for a short time to exist, the „tolerance‟ would not last. 
By the turn of the decade, most of Moscow Helsinki Watch would be charged, jailed, or 
exiled.
65
  
In response to this crackdown on dissident activity in the USSR, Robert Bernstein, head 
of publishing company Random House, together with civil libertarian Aryeh Neier and 
prominent lawyer Orville Schell Jr., established a U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee.
66
 Aided 
by a $US500,000 grant from the Ford Foundation, the U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee was 
established as an „independent, non-governmental organization composed of a representative 
group of private US opinion leaders‟ with the express charter to promote and monitor 
compliance with the „human rights provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords,‟ and to provide 
„moral support for the activities of the beleaguered Helsinki monitors in the Soviet bloc.‟67 
Central to their focus on the Soviet bloc was an emphasis on civil and political rights, 
particularly freedom of expression, freedom of movement, and the right to travel. Campaigns 
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were launched for the release of many Soviet writers, scientists, academics, and other non-
violent activists. Newspaper articles were published and letters written to members of 
congress, governors and the president, requesting action be taken on behalf of the imprisoned 
and persecuted. Pressure politics were central to the U.S. Helsinki Watch strategy.  
Scrutiny was not reserved for Soviet compliance, however, as the U.S. Helsinki group 
focused equally on U.S. domestic compliance with the Accords. For example, in a letter to 
President Carter dated 24 April 1980, the U.S. Helsinki Watch committee chastised the 
President for his government „violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the Helsinki Accords,‟ 
for „interfering with the right of Americans to travel‟ as a result of a travel ban to Iran 
imposed by the Carter government.
68
 Such direct enforcement of Helsinki principles, 
domestically and internationally, would become a hallmark of the Helsinki Watch 
Committees as the battle to ensure deeds matched words accelerated into the 1980s. 
 The move from collective minority rights to individual rights in the 1940s proved 
propitious. Whilst it did not herald a „human rights revolution,‟ it was most certainly a 
„strange triumph.‟ Although the individual rights regime of the 1940s was notable for its 
ambiguity and lack of enforceability and positive legal value, this did not result in an 
irredeemable situation. Instead, these characteristics allowed for a more diffuse appropriation 
of meaning, giving local grievances an international language and vice versa. Whilst the Cold 
War and wars of decolonisation waged, individual human rights discourse was being woven 
into the fabric of international exchange. The revival of human rights in the 1970s, therefore, 
was by no means arbitrary. It was, however, largely contingent on the communication and 
enforcement revolutions – the latter facilitated by former – of this time. The rapid 
professionalisation of human rights organisations gave the movement new life. Information 
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gathering and distribution was bolstered by the commercialisation of the air industry and 
explosion of the global media. These developments helped establish credible and efficient 
human rights reporting system that would lead to a new way in which activists could agitate 
for change. Gone were the mass mobilisations of the grassroots activism of the 1960s. Third-
party pressure politics were proving to be far more effective in both outcomes and cost. The 
signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 would provide the ideal arena in which the 
international human rights movement could flex its newly found muscles. 
 In this chapter it has been argued that the international human rights movement was 
the product of historically contingent circumstances. The ambiguity of the individual rights 
regime of the 1940s allowed for individual human rights discourse to be woven into the 
fabric of international exchange. However, they lacked positive legal value and therefore 
remained largely unenforceable. The signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 was the catalyst 
for the explosion of activist networks that provided the impetus the movement had previously 
lacked. The 1970s „enforcement revolution,‟ facilitated by the communication and transport 
revolutions of the same decade, permanently placed human rights on the international agenda. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Chapter Two 
The Politics of Anti-Politics: 
Human Rights Discourse and the National Interest 
 
[O]ur newest experiences and our most recent fear... [are] a matter of thought and thoughtlessness – the heedless 
recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of „truths‟ which have become trivial and empty – 
[This] seems to me among the outstanding characteristics of our time.  
- Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
 
This chapter will examine the machinations of US domestic politics that would result in 
the decoupling of human rights from their traditional grounding in law. In order to 
demonstrate this, a discussion of the factors that led to Jimmy Carter‟s loss to Ronald Reagan 
in the 1980 US presidential election is necessary. As while Carter brought human rights to the 
heart of global rhetoric, their path would be an arduous one under the Reagan administration.  
At the risk of over privileging the role of the United States in the development of the 
international human rights movement, one also cannot understate the impact that US politics 
and foreign policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s had on the trajectory of the movement. 
The presidential term of Jimmy Carter (1976-1981) would bring human rights politics from 
the periphery to the heart of the political arena. However, his inability to consistently execute 
a foreign policy that privileged human rights over the national interest would lead to his loss 
of the presidency after just one term in office. There were multiple factors that led to the 
election of Ronald Reagan. Most relevant for this discussion are the fracturing of the 
Democratic Party in the late 1970s and the upsurgeance of the neoconservative thinking in 
28 
 
American politics. The election of Ronald Reagan as US president in January 1980 would 
have a profound effect on the movement. Through the implementation of the policy of 
„democracy promotion,‟ as well as the theoretical justification for the support of right-wing 
autocratic regimes, human rights would be decoupled from its grounding in the law. The bold 
neoconservative rhetoric and staunch anticommunism of Reagan and his administration 
would only serve to further blur the lines when it came to human rights and morality in 
politics. In response to this, members of Helsinki Watch would establish America‟s Watch to 
monitor not only US compliance to the Accords, but also to monitor its policies in Latin 
America. As the politics of anti-politics were pursued, it would become increasingly apparent 
that there was more than one path where human rights were concerned.
69
 
Helsinki marked the re-entrance of human rights onto the main stage of international 
geopolitics. However, it had not truly penetrated US politics – internationally or domestically 
– until the election of Jimmy Carter to the office of US president in 1977. Whilst Gerald Ford 
had signed the Helsinki Accords, his inability to articulate its benefits proficiently enough at 
home contributed to his loss of the presidency in 1976.
70
 The revelations of illegal, 
scandalous, and morally corrupt activities that had been performed in the name of the U.S. 
Government and its people – such as Watergate, the covert activities of the CIA as revealed 
by the Church Committee, and the Vietnam War – had left the American public feeling 
disillusioned to say the least. The alignment of human rights with morally responsible 
politics, as championed by Carter, was therefore met by a highly receptive audience.
71
 
Capitalising on the discontent pervading the American political landscape, Carter‟s 1976 
presidential campaign is notable for his promise to morally transcend politics. This would 
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pave the way for the human rights „explosion‟ that brought human rights from the periphery 
of politics and grassroots activism into the heart of global rhetoric.
72
 In his inaugural address 
Carter stated: 
Our commitment to human rights must be absolute, our laws fair, our natural beauty 
preserved; the powerful must not persecute the weak, and human dignity must be enhanced... Because 
we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a 
clearcut preference for these societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human 
rights.
73
 
Human rights had been brought to the fore as Carter introduced human rights into the 
mainstream and gave it, as an idea, unprecedented exposure. 
1977 would be a breakthrough year for human rights, and in the United States this was 
largely due to President Carter‟s particular style of politics. Coming to power in a climate of 
disillusionment, Carter‟s fusion of human rights rhetoric with moralistic politics presented a 
way forward for many, particularly the fractured Democratic constituency.
74
 For the 
Democratic hawks, it presented an alternative to the „morally bankrupt‟ detente.75 While for 
the Democratic doves, it restored the integrity of the US from the „moral muck‟ of the 
anticommunist crusade of the 1960s, such as Vietnam and U.S. support of right-wing 
dictators.
76
 Carter‟s human rights politics was to take U.S. foreign policy in a radical new 
direction. Eager to break away from the Cold War rhetoric and orthodoxies of his 
predecessors, Carter aimed to move U.S. foreign policy onto a moralistic, „post-Cold War‟ 
path.
77
 In the years following, Carter and his administration would attempt to substitute 
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politics with morality – to create some form of paradoxical anti-politics within politics – in an 
attempt to reinstate the moral integrity of the US in the eyes of the world.
78
   
Whilst Carter‟s ambition was admirable, it became apparent that it was not practicable. 
Crises in Nicaragua, Iran, and Afghanistan, to name a few, ensured that the Cold War 
remained at the forefront of foreign policy considerations. Furthermore, Carter‟s responses to 
the various crises made it increasingly apparent that he lacked any formal human rights 
agenda. As one observer, Charles Maechling Jr., an international lawyer and State 
Department official in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, quipped: „the Carter 
rhetoric was so enthusiastic about the full range of human rights as to display no sense of 
priorities.
79
 Carter was criticised widely for his lack of consistency. And while there is much 
debate as to whether this was due to naivety, incompetence or simply a lack of any calculated 
policy articulation, what cannot be doubted is Carter‟s sincerity in his commitment to human 
rights.
80
 Carter‟s brand of moral interventionism meant that foreign policy was not only 
defined in terms of human rights, but also prioritised them. His successful incorporation of 
human rights rhetoric into his politics though, resulted in an inability to create any form of 
mutual exclusivity among, or total absorption of, morality and politics.
81
 Instead, what Carter 
achieved was a relocation of human rights from the periphery of politics to the heart of it.  
Not everyone was happy with the direction that Carter had taken. Particularly the 
fractured Democratic Party constituency. The eventual split amongst the Democratic Party 
ranks would have a significant impact on the direction that US foreign policy would take. The 
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Democratic Party was deeply divided by the end of Carter‟s first term. Many hawks felt that 
Carter‟s policies were a manifestation of the increasing influence that the New Left had 
within the party. They felt that the traditional blue collar interests of the Democratic Party 
had been abandoned, and the party had moved too far to the Left. Two factions of the 
Democratic Party – the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) and Committee on the 
Present Danger (CPD) – formed in opposition to this. They shared a common enemy – the 
New Left – although their views differed widely. The CDM was more concerned with the 
internal workings of the Democratic Party itself, while the CPD focused on foreign policy. 
They felt that America had grown militarily and strategically weak in the face of Soviet 
expansion, and perceived American military strength as the key to securing democracy and 
freedom.
82
 This faction would become a major source of neoconservative thinkers and 
strategists.
83
 Convinced that Carter was not their man, his hardline response to the hostage 
situation in Iran (November 4 1979 to January 20 1981) did naught to remedy the deep 
dissatisfaction felt by the right-leaning Democrats.
84
 Reagan on the other hand, appealed to 
the disaffected Democrats. He had been on the CPD, an active member of American‟s for 
Democratic Action, and a staunch anticommunist trade union leader, only to convert to 
Republicanism at the age of 51.
85
 There would be a large defection of CDM and CPD 
members who would vote Republican in the Carter-Reagan election.
86
  
The Democratic defection to the Reagan camp would prove fateful. In an article that 
caught the attention of Reagan during his candidacy, key CPD member Jeane Kirkpatrick had 
articulated an early version of what would later become the core principle of Reagan‟s 
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foreign policy – „democracy promotion.‟87 Kirkpatrick‟s article, published in Commentary 
magazine in November 1979 and titled „Dictatorships and Double Standards,‟ argued for an 
alignment of „liberal idealism,‟ the „national interest‟ and the „defense of freedom.‟ 
Distinguishing between totalitarian tyrants (of which violent communist revolutionaries, or as 
Kirkpatrick classed them „revolutionary autocracies,‟ were „unlikely‟ to become anything 
but) and U.S. friendly, non-communist, traditional and semi-traditional autocratic regimes, 
Kirkpatrick justified U.S. support of strategic, albeit despotic, regimes in the name of 
anticommunist crusade.
 88
 „Democracy promotion,‟ although not initially identified as such, 
provided the policy crystallisation that Carter had lacked. And while Kirkpatrick‟s thesis was 
by no means new, it was by far the most explicit expression of American imperialism for 
decades. Its premise – that the U.S. should privilege the national interest through favouring 
„friendly‟ despots, and actively promote „freedom‟ through supporting anticommunist 
regimes – would inform foreign policy throughout Reagan‟s presidency.  For example, 
Richard D. Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs, in a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1985, directly 
referenced Kirkpatrick‟s thesis in support of his postulation that there is a clear and 
recognisable difference between a „totalitarian‟ and „authoritarian‟ government in the way 
that religion is treated. An authoritarian government will „generally speaking permit‟ a 
religious organisation. A totalitarian government „cannot tolerate... any kind of independent 
association of its citizens.‟89 Whilst persecution of religious groups within the Soviet Union 
was of course a cause for concern, the logic that Schifter has based his imperative upon is 
simply hypocritical. Only a couple of years earlier, Reagan had been diverting secret funds to 
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aid the hard-line Christian and staunch anticommunist, Argentine General Leopoldo Galtieri 
whose „autocratic‟ regime would not allow a gathering of more than two people, anywhere, 
for whatever reason, religious or not.
90
 The inherent hypocrisy was appalling, although it did 
not act as a deterrent for the Reagan administration.  
The reconciliation of support for local „freedom fighters‟ with defence against 
communism and the commitment to human rights was a hotly debated topic.
91
 Reagan had 
laced his political rhetoric with human rights discourse, yet he was simultaneously 
propagating support for violent and repressive autocrats in the name of anticommunism. How 
would the administration resolve this apparent paradox? Kirkpatrick, and ultimately Reagan, 
would take the long-view, rationalising such a policy as „ends justifying the means.‟ That is, 
as Kirkpatrick argued in „Dictatorships & Double Standards,‟ while „...no idea holds greater 
sway in the mind of educated Americans than the belief that it is possible to democratize 
governments, anytime, anywhere, under any circumstances,‟ efforts to democratise traditional 
autocracies must be timed correctly as, „the speed which armies collapse, bureaucracies 
abdicate, and social structures dissolve once the autocrat is removed frequently surprises 
American policymakers...‟ Thus in order to prevent the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology 
and Soviet influence, these autocratic leaders must be supported until appropriate as to do 
otherwise would equate to „remain[ing] passive in the face of communist expansion...‟ and 
„...actually facilitate the job of the insurgents.‟92 Or, as Roger Fontaine, Reagan‟s chief aide 
on Latin America put it, „[w]e must maintain our interest in promoting democracy without 
getting disillusioned because there‟s a military coup in Honduras and the general‟s didn‟t 
respond the way we wanted... We can‟t keep reprimanding other republics because they 
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misbehave.‟93 This was a familiar critique of Carter‟s foreign policy by Reagan during the 
election campaign and would remain a theme of foreign policy justifications throughout his 
presidency.  
In the Kirkpatrick-Reaganite paradigm, there were two primary assumptions that 
allowed for the support of right-wing autocratic regimes, the first facilitating the second. 
Firstly, autocratic regimes were believed to maintain stability and prevent revolution 
(particularly leftist insurgencies), thus were integral to the protection of U.S. investments and 
trade, and more importantly, the U.S. national interest. Secondly, as autocratic regimes were 
thought to maintain stability they were more likely than left-leaning regimes to cultivate 
democratic institutions and eventually facilitate a transition into democratic governance.
94
 In 
an address to British Parliament on June 8, 1982, Reagan expressed just this, stating: 
We cannot ignore the fact that even without our encouragement there has been and will 
continue to be repeated explosions against repression and dictatorships. The Soviet Union itself is not 
immune to this reality. Any system is inherently unstable that has no peaceful means to legitimize its 
leaders. In such cases, the very repressiveness of the state ultimately drives people to resist it, if 
necessary, by force. While we must be cautious about forcing the pace of change, we must not hesitate 
to declare our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move toward them. We must be 
staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable 
and universal right of all human beings.
95
 
Basically, what Reagan was asserting here was that the promotion of liberal democracy and 
democratic institutions was necessary to defend against the spread of communism.
96
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Indirectly, he was also arguing that stable societies, in general, are necessary in order to 
achieve democracy and freedom. Moreover, in naming „freedom‟ as a basic right, Reagan had 
conflated the achievement of human rights with the establishment of democratic governance 
and the defeat of communism. In just a few sentences, Reagan expertly amalgamated the 
multiple dimensions of his foreign policy: anticommunism, democracy promotion, support of 
right-wing autocrats, the national interest and human rights. This rhetoric, however, would 
prove to be a double-edged sword as it opened Reagan to charges of hypocrisy. As whilst 
Reagan was criticising the Soviets for establishing a regime „by bayonet,‟ in Latin America, 
Reagan was doing just the same, albeit indirectly, through fostering right-wing autocratic 
regimes.
97
 
 This ideological nuance in Reaganite policy is fundamental to understanding the 
course that human rights discourse would take. In tying human rights to democratic 
governance, instead of international law, the Reagan administration transformed their human 
rights policy into a policy of „democracy promotion.‟98 Democracy promotion was essentially 
U.S. political imperialism. It sought to export and implement (by force if necessary) 
American-style democracy. That is, liberal democratic society in which civil-society 
institutions – such as the press, political parties, and trade unions – existed independently of 
the state. As Reagan asserted in his 1982 Address to British Parliament: 
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The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the 
system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own 
way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.
99
 
The irony was that Reagan intended to implement this „infrastructure‟ even if it meant using 
force. The Reagan administration had, in a throwback to the republican ideologies of 
manifest destiny and American exceptionalism, constructed its mission in terms of the ends 
justifying the means. 
100
 The paradox inherent in such an approach was apparently not 
missed, but rather ideologically justified insofar as the use of U.S. power was benevolent. 
Thus any actions taken in the long-term defence of freedom or promotion of democracy were 
necessary aberrations.
101
 Human rights had been appropriated by neoconservative ideology. 
How damaging this would be to the movement would remain to be seen. Such a blatant 
deviation from the essence of the international human rights movement was a source of much 
uproar both domestically and abroad; particularly as Reagan‟s own disregard for human 
rights became evident.  
That Reagan‟s stand on human rights differed starkly from his predecessors was 
confirmed almost immediately. Reagan‟s choice of staff was the first indication that the 
„national interest‟ had subsumed human rights in policy priorities. As James T. Baker, White 
House Chief of Staff, stated in a memorandum quoted in the New York Times on 9 
November 1981, Reagan‟s foreign policy would be one of „quiet diplomacy.‟ That is, the 
President would, „speak out where it is necessary in order to emphasize his concern and 
commitment to human rights,‟ and „where that‟s not necessary, he will deal with it through 
quiet diplomacy.‟102  The policy of „quiet diplomacy‟ essentially relegated all human rights 
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issues, and any related diplomatic concerns, to behind closed doors. The opaque nature of the 
policy was problematic and highly criticised. One such criticism aired was that of Argentine 
newspaper publisher and former political prisoner, Jacobo Timerman. Speaking at the 1981 
annual general meeting of Amnesty International, Timerman said that Reagan‟s policy would 
be interpreted by dictators on the left and right as „unlimited licence to trample on human 
rights.‟ And, „diplomatic and political theories like the thesis of quiet diplomacy... just 
replace the idea of human rights with a mere technical or strategic exercise.‟103 Reagan‟s 
policy of quiet diplomacy was definitely a cause of concern.  
Especially as Reagan‟s lead staff members were not necessarily the most avid advocates 
for human rights in the foreign policy agenda. As mentioned earlier, his appointment of Jeane 
Kirkpatrick as U.S. Ambassador to the UN certainly signified that Reagan would most 
definitely not pick up where his predecessor had left off. Kirkpatrick was no proponent of 
human rights as a core tenet of foreign policy decisions – unless of course, they ran parallel to 
the national interest. Likewise, Andrew Haig to Secretary of State indicated a reprioritisation 
of Cold War objectives, stating outright that Reagan would „draw the line‟ on communist 
advance in Latin America.
104
 Most troubling, however, was his nomination of Ernest Lefever 
for the post of Assistant Secretary of State of State for Human Rights. Lefever was another 
notorious critic of Carter‟s policies. Most worrisome were his views on the place of human 
rights in foreign policy. For example, Lefever had testified in the 1979 Bonker Subcommittee 
on Foreign Affairs:  
 
... the United States should remove from all statute books all clauses that establish a human 
rights standard or condition that must be met by another sovereign nation. In a formal and legal sense, 
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the U.S. has no responsibility – and certainly no authority – to promote human rights in other sovereign 
states.
 105
  
He had also expressed, post-nomination, that „economic and military aid should be given or 
withheld to encourage sound external practices, but not to reform domestic institutions or 
practices, however obnoxious.‟106 That Lefever‟s views, as Aryeh Neier noted, „directly 
contradicted the body of U.S. laws he would have to enforce,‟ did not seem to faze Reagan.107 
Human rights groups were understandably concerned and would successfully campaign to 
block his confirmation.
108
 It would take 5 months until Reagan would appoint Elliott Abrams, 
another Democratic hawk convert, to the post.  
If there was any doubt that Reagan was taking a new line, the 1981 declaration of 
support for loans by international development banks to Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and 
Paraguay would remove any doubt. Carter had opposed all loans to Chile and abstained on 
proposals for international loans to Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina since 1977. However, 
in 1981, the State Department determined that „there have been significant improvements in 
the human rights situations in those countries...‟ to „not require U.S. opposition to these 
countries.‟109 This directly contravened of the 1977 Harkin Amendment to the International 
Security Act which stipulated that no economic aid be provided to, 
The government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
international recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, or inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
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punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty 
and the security of a person.
110
 
That the situation had „improved‟ should not have had bearing if consistent violations were 
still taking place – which in fact, they were. For example, at this time Argentina was 
estimated to be holding around 900 people in „prolonged detention without charges,‟ and was 
refusing to account for the „disappearances‟ of up to 20,000 people in the period spanning 
1976-1981, a „flagrant denial... [of] life, liberty and the security of a person.‟111 Nonetheless, 
the policy was defended. The State Department argued that: 
... we believe that more will be gained for human rights by recognizing improvement than by 
the continued public condemnation implicit in negative votes or abstentions on international loans.
112
 
The Reagan administration was changing the rules of the game. By manipulating definitions 
or inherent meanings, the administration was side-stepping criticism and legislation. This 
would become pervasive in the administration‟s implementation of foreign policy.  
For neoconservatives human rights were not a legal discourse, but rather a moral one. 
Through the equating of human rights with morality, human rights had been wrested from its 
grounding in law. The decoupling of human rights from international law by the 
neoconservatives was problematic to say the least. As Nicolas Guilhot explains, 
neoconservative ideology achieved a „conceptual displacement,‟ that is, „while human rights 
were theretofore considered as a bulwark against state power, they [were] now equated with 
it.‟ 113 Through the equation of power with morality, neoconservatives positioned themselves 
to potentially circumvent the legalities of their actions. The human rights movement was 
drawing ever closer to the state and its mechanisms. That the state in question believed that 
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„peace,‟ „freedom,‟ and human rights could be delivered through flouting the system it 
propounded was an ominous start to a presidential term. This element of neoconservative 
ideology lay in stark contrast to the human rights as conceived by the U.S. Helsinki Watch 
Committees, whose practice was anchored in international human rights norms as enshrined 
in law. Theirs was an activism of enforcement, enforcement of international conventions and 
treaties and of international law. Thus, the neoconservative redirection of human rights as 
ideology was profoundly problematic for the U.S. Helsinki Watch groups. 
The election of Ronald Reagan as president in November 1980 provided the impetus for 
Robert Bernstein, Orville Schell and Aryeh Neier to found America‟s Watch. Much of the 
work of Helsinki Watch had, up to this point, aligned with the foreign policy of both Carter 
and early Reagan as it largely focused on securing civil and political liberties within the 
Soviet bloc. As Neier noted, it became immediately apparent with the election of Reagan that 
„if we wanted to have an impact on human rights policy, we had to establish a capacity to 
work on Latin America.‟114 As where „Jimmy Carter had embraced our cause [the 
international human rights movement]... the new team of advisors repudiated the Carter 
policy.‟115 Furthermore, it had become necessary to demonstrate that the Watch groups were 
not just fronts for Cold War doctrine. As noted in the previous chapter, credibility was 
essential for the new activist model of the international human rights movement.
116
 However, 
with the constant presence of Cold War rivalries, neutrality and impartiality were more 
pertinent than ever. Human rights as anti-politics had had its day. This was compounded by 
the ever evolving activism that was growing increasingly elitist. Third-party pressure politics 
was proving to be a far more effective and efficient activist model than the grassroots 
activism on which the movement was built. Being a small operation of specialists, such as 
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lawyers, journalists and lobbyists, U.S. Helsinki Watch and America‟s Watch could 
effectively battle successive administrations and national governments on their human rights 
records and moral responsibility of others actions. Helsinki Watch had provided the 
anticommunist credentials to stave off any right-wing anticommunist fear mongering. 
America‟s Watch would provide the platform for the Watch groups to demonstrate their 
commitment to neutrality and impartiality – their handling of the Reagan administration‟s 
policy toward El Salvador providing a case in point to be dealt with in the next chapter. 
Whilst the 1960s and 1970s saw human rights operate as a form of anti-politics on the 
periphery of the political arena, the 1980s would see human rights moved to the heart of 
global rhetoric in an unprecedented way. Reagan had inextricably tied human rights to the 
establishment of American-style democracy. Arguing that it was only under these political 
conditions could human rights flourish or be respected. Human rights were now enmeshed 
with Cold War objectives. This was, to say the least, a highly problematic development. 
Anchored in Cold War strategy, the neoconservative reimagining of human rights crystallised 
them in terms of ideology, wresting them away from their traditional grounding in law. 
Reagan sought a synthesis between neo-liberal politics, anticommunism, and the national 
interest. Human rights rhetoric provided him with a palatable discourse in which to articulate 
this, and Kirkpatrick‟s doctrine a theoretical grounding in which to base such objectives. 
With the upsurgeance of the neoconservative movement off the back of Ronald Reagan‟s 
election to office in 1980, the „idea‟ of human rights became increasingly blurred. Whilst 
human rights had flourished due to its ambiguity, this success would prove to be a double-
edged sword. Through the vacuum left by the ambiguity surrounding human rights proper, 
Reagan and his colleagues would attempt to assert their own hegemony over their meaning. 
This would come back to haunt the Reagan administration, as they found themselves 
42 
 
increasingly rhetorically entrapped.
117
 Whilst successive U.S. presidents appropriated human 
rights discourse into their politics, it was not long before the Watch committees were 
responding in a like manner. Particularly after the election of Reagan into office, it was no 
longer practicable – nor possible – to contain human rights activism to the periphery of 
politics.  
In this chapter it has been argued that the fracturing of the Democratic Party 
constituency and the emergence of neoconservative ideology resulted in the decoupling of 
human rights from international law and its appropriation into the realm of morality. These 
developments manifest in the implementation of „democracy promotion‟ as a core tenet of 
U.S. foreign policy under Reagan. This was a highly problematic development for the 
international human rights community, particularly America‟s Watch, who based their 
activism on enforcement of international laws and conventions. The next chapter will deal 
with the consequences of these developments.  
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Chapter Three 
A Surrogate Villain:  
The Reagan Administration, Human Rights,  
and U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America 
 
What the hell is „moderately repressive‟ – that you only torture half of the people, that you only do summary 
executions now and then? I don‟t even know what „moderately repressive‟ is.118 – Patricia Derian, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1977-1981. 
 
This chapter investigates the utilisation of human rights discourse under the Reagan 
administration and, specifically, the place it held in Latin American foreign policy. As 
„democracy promotion‟ was conflated with human rights, the Reagan administration would 
subsume human rights into its foreign policy objectives. Whilst Carter had been a great ally 
to the cause, it was apparent from the outset that the Reagan administration intended to take a 
different path. The policy of „democracy promotion‟ would result in the resumption of 
unconditional support for „friends‟ and allies of the Administration. In the case of El 
Salvador, it meant supporting the brutal counter-insurgency tactics employed by the 
Salvadoran government. The denial of a massacre of unarmed non-combatants in El Mozote 
to secure further economic and military aid was a particularly blatant example. For the 
Reagan administration, human rights discourse and information ultimately served an 
advocacy function to achieve foreign policy objectives.
119
 As the Administration continued to 
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emphasise the importance of human rights, however, they found themselves rhetorically 
trapped. Moreover, they were increasingly called upon to show consistency between their 
policy objectives and their actions, at home and abroad.
120
 America‟s Watch would play a 
lead role in holding the United States government to account through exposing the Reagan 
administration as a „surrogate villain.‟121 The battle over words and deeds that ensued would 
have significant bearing on the trajectory of human rights discourse and activism.  
American influence in Latin America has a long history, and the projection of U.S. 
power in the region predates the Cold War. The advent of the Cold War amplified U.S. 
involvement in Latin America. Largely driven by its existing economic and strategic 
presence, U.S. influence was predominantly evident through the presence of U.S. supported 
right-wing military dictatorships throughout Latin America.
 
U.S. influence was so pervasive 
that historian John Coatsworth figures that between 1948 and 1990, the U.S. government – 
either through direct military involvement, CIA managed revolts or assassination, or through 
indirect U.S. influence, such as military coup d’état – overthrew „at least‟ twenty-four Latin 
American governments.
122
 Guided by the belief that American interests – regional stability, 
anticommunism, trade and commercial interests, for example – were best served and secured 
by the support of such regimes, successive U.S. presidents supported authoritarian regimes in 
Latin America.
123
 Domestic struggles were being amalgamated into the greater ideological 
warfare being waged across the globe. The result was that the stakes were raised and 
protagonists polarised.
124
 Human rights violations in the region soared – particularly in the 
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late 1970s and 1980s.
125
 For example, a report issued in 1981 by a United Nations working 
group cited 11,000 to 13,000 cases of „disappearances‟ worldwide, of which ten of the fifteen 
countries reported on were Latin American states: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Uruguay.
126
 This context was intensified 
with the heating up of the Cold War in the early 1980s, largely spurred by the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan on 24 December 1979. 
The election of Ronald Reagan to the office of President brought a new direction in 
U.S. foreign policy, particularly toward Latin America. Informed by the neoconservative 
critique of Carter‟s foreign policy, best articulated by Jeane Kirkpatrick in her January 1981 
Commentary article titled „U.S. Security & Latin America,‟ it was charged that: 
... [Carter‟s] policies have not only proved incapable of dealing with the problems of 
Soviet/Cuban expansion in the area [Latin America], they have positively contributed to them and to 
the alienation of major nations, the growth of neutralism, the destabilization of friendly governments, 
the spread of Cuban influence, and the decline of U.S. power in the region.
 127
 
It was Kirkpatrick whose article „Dictatorships and Double Standards‟ had shaped much of 
Reagan‟s foreign policy thinking. As discussed in the previous chapter, a core tenet was the 
confrontation of Soviet expansion through ideological offensive – namely, „democracy 
promotion.‟ The Third World, particularly Latin America, was seen as being the most 
vulnerable to Soviet influence. As Kirkpatrick writes in „U.S. Security & Latin America‟: 
The deterioration of the U.S. position in the hemisphere has already created serious 
vulnerabilities where none previously existed, and threatens now to confront this country with the 
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unprecedented need to defend itself against a ring of Soviet bases on and around our southern and 
eastern borders.
128
 
The Reaganite Cold War view was classically bipolar with little or no view to the individual, 
domestic or international complexities of pre-existing experiences or conflicts.
129
 As Jeri 
Laber, one of the founding members of Human Rights Watch observed of the Reagan 
administration‟s mentality at the time: 
The administration saw Soviet encroachment behind every left-leaning government and every 
local insurgency in Central America. It applied the „domino theory,‟ arguing that one country after 
another would fall under communism‟s sway, that we might have a succession of Cubas at our 
doorstep.
130
 
The transposition of Cold War bipolarities onto domestic conflicts would be a hallmark of the 
Reagan Administration. To largely devastating effect as Latin American became the key 
focus of the administration‟s policies. 
The first comprehensive expression of Reagan‟s foreign policy was issued in May 
1982. The „U.S. National Security Strategy,‟ approved by Reagan on the 20th of that month, 
established the objectives of the national security policy of the United States as being, among 
others:  
- To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its allies, and other 
important countries across the spectrum of conflict; and to defeat such attack should 
deterrence fail. 
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- To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the world by strengthening existing 
alliances by forming and supporting coalitions of states friendly to U.S. interests, and by a 
full range of diplomatic, political, economic, and information efforts. 
- To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout 
the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and 
subversive forces... 
- To limit Soviet military capabilities by strengthening the U.S. military... 
- To ensure the U.S. access to foreign markets... 
-  To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and investment programs that promote 
economic development and the growth of humane social and political orders in the Third 
World...
131
 
This was the most explicit policy of U.S. imperialism in decades and marked a pointed 
intensification of the Cold War.
132
 Central to this policy was a focus on Latin America. As 
mentioned earlier, Latin America was believed to be the region most susceptible to Soviet 
influence. The resumption of the policy, partially abandoned by Carter, of unconditionally 
supporting anticommunist „U.S. friendly‟ states and regimes – predominantly right-wing 
„traditional autocracies‟ – was a direct product of this belief.133  
Again, Kirkpatrick had provided the theoretical grounding for the policy with her 
„lesser of two evils‟ approach. That is, whilst „traditional autocracies are, in general and in 
their very nature, deeply offensive to modern American sensibilities,‟ they were preferable to 
left-leaning insurgents as „the unpleasant fact‟ was, according to Kirkpatrick, „if victorious, 
violent insurgency headed by Marxist revolutionaries is unlikely to lead to anything but 
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totalitarian tyranny.‟134 What „unpleasant fact‟ Kirkpatrick relied on to come to such a 
conclusion is unclear. Nonetheless, this stance was directly championed by Reagan, who duly 
positioned right-wing autocrats as „freedom fighters‟ in America‟s frontline battle against 
communism, well into his second term as president. In his 1985 State of the Union address, 
Reagan explicitly reiterated his support of anticommunist regimes worldwide: 
We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives – on every continent, from 
Afghanistan to Nicaragua – to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been 
ours from birth... Support for freedom fighters is self-defense.
135
 
Self-defence and anticommunism had become synonymous with the national interest, as 
policy makers linked the protection of liberalism and expansion of American-style 
democracy with defence against communism and the containment of the Soviet Union.
136
 
Underlying the Reagan administration‟s foreign policy was a penchant for 
manipulating human rights information to justify the execution of such foreign policy goals. 
U.S. relations with El Salvador provide an especially illustrative example. The situation in El 
Salvador was already dire when Reagan took office in January 1981. A military coup d’état, 
led by Jose Napoleon Duarte, executed on 15 October 1979, had overthrown the repressive 
government regime led by General Humberto Romero and installed a five person junta 
comprised of three civilians and two members of the Salvadoran armed forces.
137
 This 
resulted in a temporary resumption of active civil and political activity for three months until, 
unable to control the Salvadoran military, the three civilian members of the junta resigned in 
protest to the continued repressive measures the military and police were taking to subdue 
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opposition.
138
 In the following months the El Salvadoran Civil War broke out. Torture, mass 
murder, political assassinations, „disappearances,‟ and other brutal measures were 
characteristic of the bloody Civil War. As Aryeh Neier, Executive Director of America‟s 
Watch, noted of the crisis in El Salvador,   
El Salvador... gained notoriety in 1981 because of the extreme brutality of its armed forces 
and the extraordinary number of violent abuses of human rights they committed before the outbreak of 
war in 1980 and, to an even greater extent, once the war began.
139
 
The El Salvadoran Civil War would witness 70,000 people lose their lives, 40,000 of which 
were  mostly unarmed and non-combatant Salvadorans murdered by the armed forces, and 
the creation of over 500,000 refugees.
140
 
The conflict in El Salvador was treated by the Reagan administration in predictable 
fashion: framing the conflict in terms of classic Cold War bipolarities. Justifications for 
continuing to support the El Salvadoran military were based on claims that Cuba was arming 
the insurgents. In a speech to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States 
on 24 February 1982, Reagan did not mince words about what he felt was „the true nature of 
the conflict in El Salvador.‟ That is, „the guerrilla‟s, armed and supported by and through 
Cuba, are attempting to impose a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship on the people of El Salvador 
as part of a larger imperialistic plan.‟ The U.S. would do „whatever is prudent and necessary 
to ensure the peace and security of the Caribbean area.‟141 Cold War rhetoric littered the 
administration‟s communications and its coverage in the media. It was not uncommon to see 
the conflict debated in the media as to whether or not it would become „another‟ Vietnam or 
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Cuba.
142
 That the El Salvadoran Civil War had other dimensions, largely unrelated to the 
Cold War, such as the social and economic upheaval that resulted after the collapse of the 
country‟s coffee economy in the late 1970s, seemed irrelevant to Washington.143 Cold War 
anxieties had been imposed on the El Salvadoran Civil War, but at what cost? 
It is widely noted that Reagan‟s election had a marked impact on the activities in El 
Salvador. Notoriously, the day after Reagan was elected to office a mutilated body was found 
on the streets of San Salvador with a message reading, „with Reagan, we will eliminate the 
miscreants and subversives in El Salvador and Central America.‟144 Reagan‟s election 
campaign, particularly his hard-line anticommunist rhetoric, had obviously been absorbed 
internationally, and his subsequent actions would do little to quell such notions. For example, 
the Reagan administration requested for the fiscal year ending 1982, $US101 million in 
economic and military aid for El Salvador (of a total of $US478 million requested for Latin 
America in general).
145
 It is necessary to note at this point that human rights and foreign 
policy had been married by Congress in the late 1970s, with legislation linking the human 
rights records of states to their qualification for U.S. aid enacted. There are three items of 
legislation that are most relevant to this discussion. First, the 1977 Harkin Amendment 
specified that no economic aid be provided to „the government of any country which engages 
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of international recognized human rights.‟146 
Second, the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act toughened 
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restrictions on the sale of American arms to foreign countries, with a specific provision 
preventing the transfer of weapons „to nations judged to have violated the human rights of 
their citizens.‟147 Thirdly, Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act required the U.S. to 
deny „security assistance‟ to any government that engaged in consistent patterns of human 
rights abuses.
148
  
In El Salvador, this same 12 month period had seen: three American nuns and one lay 
worker abducted, murdered and buried in a shallow grave; the assassination, during mass, of 
Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero; the kidnapping and murder of six leftist political leaders; 
as well as numerous reports of killings and „disappearances‟ of civilians by the notorious 
„death squads.‟ The death squads were members of the El Salvadoran military who disguised 
themselves as civilians while they did „their dirty work.‟149 Their activities would be a 
particularly contentious issue in the U.S. As Aryeh Neier attests, the identification of the 
„death squads‟ as military men was something „everybody knew,‟ but „was hotly denied by 
Reagan administration officials.‟150 There was no shortage of evidence that a „consistent 
pattern‟ of human rights abuse was occurring. 
The Reagan administration response to the situation in El Salvador was contradictory 
to say the least.  It would leave many question marks hanging over their honesty and handling 
of the crisis, as well as their continued support of the Salvadoran military forces. Congress 
would deny 60 percent of the president‟s aid requests for El Salvador in the first two years of 
his term. Yet, that Reagan even applied to Congress to support the activities of the El 
Salvadoran military could mean only one thing to the El Salvadoran government (who was 
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repeatedly failing to curb the incidence of abuses committed by both sides): a „green light.151 
As Simicha Jacobovici – writing at the time for The Globe and Mail – wrote of the 
administration‟s policies, there was „an inherent contradiction between morality and foreign 
affairs.‟152 It was ever more apparent that while human rights and democratic ideals were 
important rhetorical goals; in practice, they would cease to be practical policy 
considerations.
153
 Particularly as human rights violations became increasingly hard to ignore 
or suppress.  
 The manipulation of facts and language was a tactic employed by the administration 
to exploit loopholes in legislation that prevented the provision of support – financial or 
otherwise – to regimes guilty of human rights abuses. This was an explicit critique of the 
State Department‟s Country Report for 1981. In response to the report, America‟s Watch 
issued U.S. Reporting on Human Rights in El Salvador: Methodology at Odds with 
Knowledge.
154
 A scathing report on the use of human rights information by the Reagan 
administration, it is charged that there are „serious omission‟s‟ and „methodological 
question[‟s]‟ hanging over the Country Report. For example, the Country Report cited a 
„downward trend in political violence,‟ yet the explanation for the decline in violence  
...limits itself to body-count, excluding disappearances, reports of torture and security force 
attacks on refugee camps and other abuses that would logically fall within the category of 
“violence.”155 
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Likewise, the Country Report relied exclusively on information from the U.S. embassy, an 
organisation that was not renowned for its independence.  
Unreliable sources would be a common feature of both Embassy reports and the 
Country Reports of the Reagan administration well into its second term. In their seventh 
supplement to their human rights report on El Salvador published in 1985, titled The 
Continuing Terror, it was charged that: 
The reports prepared by the U.S. Embassy and the accompanying cables give the impression 
that the overwhelming number of killings in El Salvador are due to violence by the left. In a number of 
public statements, Embassy officials have stated that, at present, 70 percent of the political violence in 
El Salvador is due to the left. This is a false and misleading picture of the human rights situation in El 
Salvador. Among other things, the statistics published by the U.S. Embassy are inaccurate and 
unreliable because, as in the past, they are: based only on local newspaper accounts of violence; omit 
violence by the Armed Forces; grossly undercount death squad victims; and apply inconsistent 
standards to the violence perpetrated by the right and the left... A most conspicuous omission is any 
reference to the human rights information announced every Sunday during the homily by the 
Archbishop of San Salvador (or, in his absence, by the Auxiliary Bishop). In the homily, the 
Archbishop summarizes the data on political violence for the week in El Salvador as collected by the 
human rights office of the Archdiocese, Tutela Legal... Tutela Legal publishes lengthy monthly reports 
with affidavits of witnesses who have seen and describe a wide range of abuses. It is difficult to 
imagine how a complete picture of the human rights situation in El Salvador can be formed without 
reference to this source. In short, both the cables and the Statistical reports read not like objective 
compilations of all available information on human rights, but like briefs prepared for the government 
and against the opposition. They are at best the product of self-deception.
 156
 
As this extract suggests, such primary errors in human rights reporting were endemic in the 
administration‟s reporting of human rights situations. The motivation was blatant: to justify 
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American imperial pursuits through the distortion of human rights information to fit the East-
West conflict matrix.  
The tipping point for many critics came with the outright denial of the massacre in El 
Mozote on 11 December 1981.
157
 On this day, a „Rapid Deployment Infantry Battalion‟ or 
„BIRI‟ – a unit trained under the supervision of United States military advisors specialising in 
„counter-insurgency warfare‟ – interrogated, tortured, and executed the entire village of El 
Mozote, approximately one hundred and seventeen men, women, children, and infants, and 
then set their bodies alight.
 158
 The battalion then executed members of surrounding villages 
the following day. Newspaper reports at the time would estimate the death toll from the 
region surrounding El Mozote as high as 733.
159
 A UN truth commission would later exhume 
the remains found in El Mozote; identifying one hundred and forty-three bodies. Of those, 
one hundred and thirty-one were under the age of twelve and the „average age of the children 
was approximately 6 years.‟ 160 It was a callous and brutal massacre of unarmed, non-
combatant civilians.  
News of the massacre would not be broken in the U.S. media until 27 January 1982. 
The two breaking articles were published in the New York Times and Washington Post. The 
New York Times article by Raymond Bonner, announced the massacre: „733 victims listed‟; 
and the denial of responsibility by the Salvadoran armed forces: „those reports were 
fabricated by “subversives”.‟161 The State Department would join the Salvadoran 
Government in their denial. Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, testified before a Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations that,  
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... civilians did die... but no evidence could be found to confirm that Government forces 
systematically massacred civilians. Nor does the number of civilians killed even remotely approach the 
numbers being cited about the incident.
162
  
The State Department would tow the same line – disputing the accuracy and legitimacy of the 
claims of a massacre in a statement issued on 1 February 1982 – trivialising the numbers of 
victims. It read:  
Radio Vanceremos [Salvadoran guerrilla radio] issued its first report... on Dec. 27... 192 
noncombatants had died in El Mozote... On Jan. 2 it increased the figure to 472... on Jan. 27, press 
reports in the U.S. raised the figure to 700 “in and around” El Mozote.163  
The obscuring of facts – such as the event of a massacre – by disputing facts was 
symptomatic of a deeper problem within the administration. As a House Intelligence 
Committee report would find in September 1982, the problem was that „they [the existence of 
inaccuracies and oversimplifications] may signal that the environment in which analytic 
thought and production occur is under pressure to reinforce policy... rather than inform it.‟164  
To add insult to injury, one week after the reports of the massacre first surfaced Ronald 
Reagan signed an Executive Order approving $US55 million in „Defense Department funds 
and supplies for emergency assistance to El Salvador.‟ Again, a direct contravention of U.S. 
law.
165
 The Reagan administration was unscrupulously on the offensive. 
A UN truth commission would later find that of the two hundred and forty-five 
cartridge cases recovered from the El Mozote site, one hundred and eighty-four had been 
manufactured by the U.S. Government. And, „all of the projectiles except one appear to have 
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been fired from United-States manufactured M-16 rifles.‟166 Elliott Abrams would later write 
in defence of U.S. foreign policy: „When democracy is under attack, it is neither unfitting nor 
inhumane for the world‟s oldest democratic government to come to its defense.‟ One would 
argue though, that if a „democratic government‟ is tolerating, even facilitating, illegal and 
inhumane activity of its client state/s, that it is indeed unfitting and absolutely inhumane. 
Although the U.S. was not the author of the abuses, they were acting as apologists for them. 
To borrow the words of Aryeh Neier, the U.S. government was acting as a „surrogate 
villain.‟167 
Such behaviour would extend well into Reagan‟s second term. Typical responses to 
criticism aimed to either discredit, down play the seriousness, disparage the testimony of 
victims, or, as already discussed, point blank denial. A particularly succinct example of the 
devaluation of the importance of accuracy in human rights reporting is Abrams complaint 
that „there‟s an awful lot of nit-picking‟ in America‟s Watch 1982 response to the State 
Department‟s Country Report.168 Another example was Kirkpatrick‟s attempt to downplay, 
even exonerate, the actions of the Salvadoran armed forces in the case of the nuns who were 
abducted and later found murdered in 1981, stating that: „the nuns were not just nuns. The 
nuns were also political activists... on behalf of the Frente (FMLN).‟169 To insinuate, as 
Kirkpatrick had here, that the fate of the nuns was somehow excusable because of their 
supposed political affiliations is particularly troublesome, especially as she was the U.S. 
representative to the United Nations. This was a popular tactic. Elliott Abrams took the same 
tact with regard to the Salvadoran refugee crisis, stating: „the refugees there [in El Salvador] 
are not a representative proportion of the population. Although some are not guerrilla 
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sympathizers, others may be.‟170 As Reagan administration critic, Charles Maechling Jr. 
wrote in response to this, „the suggestion that to establish credibility, refugees must be 
representative of the population and enamored of their persecutors would come would come 
as a surprise to the survivors of Auschwitz.‟171 Whilst somewhat melodramatic, Maechling 
Jr.‟s point is clear. 
That the Reagan administration purported to respect, defend, and promote human 
rights made it a primary target for America‟s Watch activists. It was expected that 
perpetrators refused to expose themselves as gross violators of rights. It was not expected of 
the administration of the „oldest democracy‟ in the world to act as their guardian. The Reagan 
administration had been exposed as the leading apologist for human rights abuses throughout 
Latin America and beyond. America‟s Watch had a prominent role in this. America‟s Watch 
reports on El Salvador were read widely by Reagan policy opponents. As Jeri Laber of 
Human Rights Watch recounts,  
America‟s Watch reports on El Salvador were eagerly read by people in the United States who 
deplored the Reagan policies. U.S. public opinion had not been so polarized on a foreign policy issue 
since the Vietnam War.
172
  
The resulting public protest to U.S. policy in El Salvador led to legislation being passed in 
December of 1981 requiring periodic certification hearings for U.S. economic and military 
aid to the Latin American state. Every periodic certification of El Salvador was countered 
with a report independently compiled by America‟s Watch evaluating its accuracy. The 
ferocity of attacks by the Reagan administration ensured the reliability and credibility of 
America‟s Watch reports. Furthermore, the America‟s Watch dispute with the Reagan 
administration would often spill into the public arena, with Neier taking on Abrams in intense 
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and often acrimonious public debates.
173
 This was possible only in the context of the early 
eighties as presidential credibility was at a low ebb. The America‟s Watch strategy was 
simple, as Neier explains: 
In effect, we called President Reagan a liar.... Johnson and Nixon had lied, and it did not seem 
outlandish when we suggested Reagan was lying to achieve one of his foremost foreign policy goals.
174
 
In portraying enemies of the United States as great violators, and friends as being respectful 
of – or at the very least making progress on – human rights, the Reagan administration were 
revealing themselves to be hypocrites. Their attempts at distorting or denying human rights 
information were exposing them as dishonest apologists. They had backed themselves into a 
rhetorical trap.
175
  
 The administration‟s hand had been forced. It was increasingly being called upon, by 
America‟s Watch, Congress, the media, and the public, to match its words with deeds. The 
Reagan administration found itself forced to change tact. On 11 December 1983, Vice 
President Bush would, for the first time, publicly chastise the El Salvadoran Government. At 
a dinner hosted by El Salvador‟s president, Alvaro Magana, in San Salvador, Vice President 
Bush gave Magana an ultimatum: curb the activities of the „murderous violence of 
reactionary minorities,‟ or „lose the support of the American people.‟176 The battle was by no 
means over. The Reagan administration would continue to co-opt human rights discourse and 
manipulate human rights information to achieve foreign policy goals. As the 1988 Review of 
the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1987 notes, the 
Reagan administration was still treating some country reports, El Salvador‟s being one, as 
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serving „an advocacy function‟ for „countries where the Administration strongly identifies 
with the government or perceives important U.S. interests to be served by harmonious 
relations.‟177 Ultimately, all that would be achieved by the U.S. involvement in El Salvador 
was stalemate. Duarte‟s power was entirely superficial – his political survival wholly 
dependent upon support provided by the military, the oligarchy and the Reagan 
administration.
178
 The violence in El Salvador would continue largely unabated until the 
commencement of a peace process in 1990.
179
 The first substantive agreement was signed 
between the Salvadoran Government and the insurgents in July 1990. The 1990 San José 
Agreement opened the way for broader agreements that led to the final peace accord to be 
signed in January 1992.
180
 
The battle with the Reagan administration had a major impact on the way in which 
human rights was reported and also the way in which activists agitated for change. The 
reporting procedures and methodology that was developed by AW in the early years of the 
Reagan administration (and further finetuned throughout the decade) would lead to the style 
of human rights reporting and monitoring that dominates today. It would also position the 
Human Rights Watch Committees as leaders in the global human rights activist network – a 
reputation that would only grow in the decades to follow. As Neier attests,  
Our politically charged struggle with the Reagan administration was a testing by fire. Because 
we survived, we were toughened. It gave Human Rights Watch a degree of prestige that would 
normally take much longer to achieve, and that we might have never achieved otherwise. When we 
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began, Amnesty International was the household name. By the time the Reagan years drew to a close, 
Human Rights Watch was just as significant. The attention we garnered transformed the human rights 
field. It legitimized a focus on violations of the laws of wars, reporting of abuses by both sides in 
situations of armed conflict, efforts to hold accountable those responsible for abuses, and 
confrontations with surrogate villains over their support for those directly responsible.
181
 
Through acknowledging human rights as an important foreign policy issue, the administration 
opened themselves to being held to account for their role as surrogate villain. Their insistence 
on lacing their rhetoric in human rights discourse drew America‟s Watch into the 
metaphorical lion‟s den. This resulted in the development and honing of the efficient, 
credible, and reliable activist model that the global human rights movement operates with 
today. To revisit Susan Marks, the direction the international human rights movement took at 
this time was contingent, but by no means accidental, random, or arbitrary.
182
  
The new direction human rights took was one of ideological combat: with Reagan, 
with the Soviets, with the international human rights community.
183
 Latin America featured 
as a primary battle field as the Reagan administration diagnosed it as being most prone to 
Soviet influence. And whilst in Latin America U.S. influence, anticommunism, and harsh 
counter-insurgency techniques all predated the Cold War; the elites of the continent found the 
Reagan administration a willing accomplice in ensuring the status quo was maintained.
184
 
The U.S. influence in El Salvador is a particularly illustrative case in point. The 
administration incessantly distorted, downplayed, and outright denied human rights abuses 
committed by the El Salvadoran government, a staunch U.S. ally. And whilst it would be 
unfair and inaccurate to charge that the Reagan administration did not care at all about human 
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rights, they were at the very least cavalier and hypocritical in their stance.
185
 In the 
ideologically prescribed East-West matrix of the Reagan administration, human rights were 
never truly allowed to get in the way of policy implementation. Therefore the U.S. emerged 
as the lead apologist for abuses committed by „friends‟ and allies in the „defense of freedom.‟ 
Whilst the bulk of this analysis, for reasons of pertinence, focused on the first term of 
Reagan‟s presidency, America‟s Watch would continue to hold Reagan, and his 
administration, accountable for the entirety of his presidency. It was a „testing by fire.‟186 
Through their relentless disputation, and emphasis on reliability and accuracy, and even-
handed reporting, America‟s Watch emerged as a world leader in human rights activism, 
monitoring, and reporting. Most importantly though, they exposed the Reagan administration 
for what it was: a „surrogate villain.‟187  
This chapter has examined the fate of human rights discourse as the battle over human 
rights as law and human rights as morality was played out in Latin America. The case of El 
Salvador demonstrated the cavalier and hypocritical way that the Reagan administration 
treated human rights. Their insistence on framing their foreign policy in human rights 
discourse led, however, to their rhetorical entrapment.
188
 America‟s Watch played a key role 
in holding the Reagan administration accountable. The relentless pursuit to ensure the Reagan 
administration matched their words and deeds, resulted in the administration being exposed 
as an apologist for human rights violations and their perpetrators. The scrutiny to which they 
were subjected as a result of taking on the world‟s „oldest democracy,‟ led to the 
development of the reliable, accurate, and even-handed system of human rights monitoring 
and reporting they are world renowned for today.  
                                                          
185
 Hartmann, „US Human Rights Policy under Carter and Reagan,‟ p. 429. 
186
 Neier, Taking Liberties, p. 220. 
187
 Ibid. 
188
 Guilhot, „Limiting Sovereignty or Producing Governmentality?‟ p. 502. 
62 
 
Conclusion 
‘A Rhetoric of Convenience’? 
Human Rights Discourse under Reagan 
 
Facts are stupid things – stubborn things I should say.  
– Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Republican National Convention in New Orleans, Louisiana, August 
15, 1988 
 
When the United Nations proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights „a 
common standard of achievement for all people and nations,‟ many believed that they had 
witnessed a „revolution‟ in human rights.189 Certainly, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was a momentous achievement that marked the transition from collective minority 
rights to individual rights. However, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as rights 
agreements before it, lacked enforceability. The post-World War II world order remained 
anchored in the old ways of empire and the sanctity of state sovereignty. This left the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights incapable of moving beyond the idealism and 
sentiment that it embodied; it was therefore left reeling in the wake of the onset of the Cold 
War and wars of decolonisation. Whilst human rights made cameo appearances throughout 
the next few decades – various causes, such as self-determination, found human rights 
discourse a useful and compelling vocabulary for articulating claims within the global arena – 
they did not appear again with any great force until the 1970s. The Helsinki Accords would 
mark their re-entrance to the global arena in a big way. It would be the catalyst for the 
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„enforcement revolution,‟ as local activist networks formed to ensure their governments 
complied with its principles. The Helsinki Watch Committees (now known as Human Rights 
Watch ) – Moscow Watch, Helsinki Watch, and later, America‟s Watch– were children of 
this revolution, and as discussed in Chapter One, had significant impact on the trajectory of 
human rights discourse and activism.   
The late 1970s had seen the politics of anti-politics bring human rights from the 
periphery of politics to the heart of global rhetoric. The presidency of Jimmy Carter was, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, fundamental to this. Carter‟s attempt to transform foreign policy 
into a form of moral interventionism was damnosa hereditas. The centralisation of human 
rights in foreign policy considerations under Carter led to their denigration under the Reagan 
administration. The cavalier attitude by which human rights were manipulated and 
misconstrued, and abuses facilitated through continued U.S. support, resulted in the Reagan 
administration being the lead apologist for oppressive right-wing regimes, such as the El 
Salvadoran government, and a surrogate villain. For the Reagan administration, human rights 
were no more than „rhetoric of convenience.‟190 The extent to which the integrity of the 
human rights movement itself was damaged as a result was ameliorated by the dogged 
activism of America‟s Watch. The constant disputation of human rights information, coupled 
with the rapid development of a highly effective strategy of human rights monitoring and 
reporting was central to the battle to bring human rights back to its grounding in law. The 
decoupling of human rights from international law and its relocation to the realm of morality 
was a fundamental and highly problematic element of the Reaganite conception of human 
rights.
191
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As Nicolas Guilhot, citing Hannah Arendt, reminds us: the question that drove the 
American constitutional process was not „how can we limit power?‟ but „how can we 
establish freedom?‟ With this in mind, it is conceivable how the Reagan administration 
arrived at the theoretical grounding that it did with its foreign policy.
192
 Conflating the 
promotion of American-style democracy and the achievement of human rights was therefore 
a natural ideological progression when the ultimate goal was „freedom.‟ What was inherently 
problematic in all this was that the Reagan administration conceived of human rights as being 
secured only through the establishment of American-style democracy, and their own 
interpretation of „freedom.‟ Consequently, human rights became exclusive, and something to 
be bestowed, wholly contingent on one‟s membership in the American democratic political 
community.
193
 Human rights, in the Reagan worldview, rather than being universal, became 
privileges enjoyed only by citizens of advanced, democratic states. The Reagan 
administration‟s conception of human rights thus becomes comparable to Arendt‟s famous 
„paradox of human rights.‟ That is, the moment in which a person was in most need of their 
rights – for example, the treatment of unarmed non-combatant civilians by the El Salvadoran 
government as discussed in Chapter Three – the administration was willing obstruct, and 
even attack, authorities and institutions who had the capacity to assist, themselves included. 
In doing so, the Reagan administration threatened to relegate human rights back to the realm 
of unenforceable.
194
 
America‟s Watch played a pivotal role in ensuring that human rights remained 
enforceable. Through openly criticising the treatment of human rights information, as well as 
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the legality of the government‟s actions, America‟s Watch ensured that the Reagan 
administration was held accountable for the grievously flippant way they treated human 
rights. For the administration, they were little more than a vehicle to deliver policy with little 
or no regard given to facts. By „shading the presentation of violations‟ committed by 
perceived allies, as one America‟s Watch report put it, America‟s Watch exposed the Reagan 
administration to be very much the surrogate villain.
195
 Such accusations were not taken 
lightly. The neutral, credible and reliable system of monitoring and reporting human rights 
situations that Human Rights Watch is renowned for today developed under the intense 
scrutiny and sustained criticism of the Reagan administration.196 Despite this, the 
administration maintained – to varying degrees – its cavalier attitude to human rights. 
Continuing to support and privilege „friendly‟ states by excusing or ignoring human rights 
violations. And „with friends like these‟ supporting you, what impetus did violators of human 
rights have to curb their behaviour?
197
 The violence in El Salvador, for example, continued 
unabated until the early 1990s. 
Human rights mean different things to different people. Whilst the U.S. government 
was being held more accountable for its behaviour, the „idea‟ of human rights was still being 
imbued with a multitude of meanings – by all parties involved. The battle that waged between 
America‟s Watch and the Reagan administration was not simply over facts. It was an 
ideological battle over their very nature: human rights as law versus human rights as 
morality. The debate over the meaning of Human Rights proper and what counts under its 
banner, still rages today. The contentious nature of the debate is never far from the surface. 
For example, Aryeh Neier famously lost the battle over the status of social and economic 
                                                          
195
 America‟s Watch, Review of the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1987 
(July 1988), http://hrd.idcpublishers.info.ezproxy2.library.usyd.edu.au/hrd/protected/full-
issue.html?organization=2156&document=0036&filename=HRD-2156_033-
004.pdf&search=reagan+administration+americas+watch+1988. 
196
 Marks, „Human Rights and Root Causes,‟ p. 74. 
197
 Brown, ed., With Friends Like These, p. iii. 
66 
 
rights as human rights within the organisation that he had helped found.
198
 That there is a 
struggle over the true „meaning‟ of human rights at all is as problematical as it is promising. 
As Samuel Moyn duly warns, „...in pretending that human rights works according to moral 
principles on which everyone already agrees... depoliticize[s] what ought to be real fights 
over principles.‟199 These principles, like humanity, are constantly in flux and renewed, and 
so can never be permanently secured as such, nor represent a set core of beliefs. Rhetorical 
arguments about the existence of human rights ensure their vitality as an „idea‟ – even when 
behaviours threaten their protection and implementation.
200
 To borrow the words of Hannah 
Arendt, „basically we are always educating for a world that is or is becoming out of joint, for 
this is the basic human situation, in which the world is created by mortal hands to serve 
mortals for a limited time as home.‟201 
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